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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
ALLEN HALLSTROl\1 and
.JOHANNA C. HALL.STROM,
Plaint~ffs-Respondents

vs.

Case No.
9730

L. l\L BUHLER and
MONICA BUHLER, his wife,
Defendants-Appellants

Defendants'-Appellants' Brief Q:n Appeal
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action brought to foreclose a mortgage
given to guarantee the performance of a third party
under a real estate contract covering property in Idaho.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The judgment appealed from was rendered by the
lower court at pretrial conference in favor of plaintiff.
Defendant appeals from that judgment.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant asks that the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree be set aside and the case be
remanded for trial of the issues raised on this appeal.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 1956 one Teeples sold the defendant Buhler a
farm in Idaho under a real estwte contract. In 1958, after
improving it, Buhler sold the farm on contract to .a man
named Snyder (R. 24-31). Under the terms of this contract Snyder assumed all of the outstanding obligations
against the farm property and in addition agreed to
pay Buhler $28,641.80 for his equity. The contract required that payments on this equity be made on the 1st
of December of each year, starting in 1959, at the rate
of $2.,000.00 per year, plus in!terest.
Thereafter, on or about August 5, 1959, Buhler
needed funds, and arranged to receive $14,371.88 from
Plaintiff Hallstrom. Under the arrangement agreed upon between them Buhler assigned all of his right, title
and interest in and to bo1th the Teeples-Buhler contract
and the Buhler-Snyder contract to H'allstrom (R. 50),
but Hallstrom admits that only $19,938.86 of the contract
equity was to pass (C01nplaint, R.2).
In addition to the contracts assigned, Buhler agre•ed
to guarantee that Snyder would perform under the contract. The guaranty :took the form of and was secured by
a mortgage which Buhler gave Hallstrom on his home
in Salt Lake City (R. 5, 6). This mortgage guaranteed
"the payment by said William Snyder and Irene Louise
Snyder, of the sums that will be due and payable to the
above named mortgagees [HallstrOin] under said contract and assignment" (R. 5). ·The amount of the mortgage given to guarantee Snyder's performance was
$25,615.96, an amount equal to $19,938.86 plus the inter-
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est which Hallstrom would receive when the contract was
perfonned by Snyder in accordance with its terms (R.S.2).
The contracts were perfonned until December of
1960 when Snyder defaulted (R.2). On January 13, 1961
Hallstrom conunenced this action to foreclose the mortgage alleging that the balance due thereon was $17,938.86
(R.l-6). Through counsel Buhler filed an Answer and
Counterclaim (R.10-13) and an Amendment to the Counterclaim (R.14,15). Hallstrom replied to the Counterclaims and the issues were joined.
Sometime between December 1, 1960 and May 6, 1961
Hallstrom apparently obtained ti!tle to the Idaho farm
from Teeples, because on the latter date he sold the farm
in Idaho on contract to a man named Adams for $25,000.00, the contract reciting a down payment of $10,000.00 (R.38,39).
1

On January 10, 1962 pretrial was held and an order
was entered granting I-Iallstrom "judgment as prayed"
(R.18,19). No evidence was introduced and no transcript
of the proceedings at pretrial exists except the Pre-Trial
Order itself (R.18). Buhler thereafter filed a motion for
adoption of a Supplemental Pre-Trial Order (R.45) and
l\Iotion for Summary Judgment (R.44). Both of these
motions were supported by Buhler's affidavit with ex..
hibits attached (R.20-42). These motions were denied
on April17, 1962 (R.70). On April16, 1962 Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Decree were entered
(R.71-83).
The Findings of Fact recite that the principal of the
mortgage as of January 10, 1962 was $18,167.31, together
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with interest accrued on the principal sun1 to that date;
they also recite that I-Iallstrmn paid Teeples $1,180.00,
that Hallstrom paid $967.50 on the mortgage and $302.02
for taxes, all payments attributable to the Idaho property, and that interest on all of the foregoing to January
10, 1962 came to $169.51; they also state that plaintiff
was entitled to attorneys' fees of $1,500.00, plus costs of
$15.20. .All of this, when added, comes to $22,301.54, plus
interest on $18,167.31. The Conclusions of L·aw recite the
same figures.
On the other hand, the complaint makes no mention
of .anything but the principal due under the mortgage,
recited at $17,938.86, plus interest to date of judgment,
attorney's fees and costs, a total of $19,454.06 (R. 1-4).
On April 25, 1962, Buhler retained his present counsel who filed a motion to set aside the Findings, Conclusions and Decree or in the alternative, to amend them.
(R.84-86). The motion was denied July 13, 1962. (R.89) .
.ARGUMENT
PRELIMINARY .ARGUl\IENT
The whole purpose of this appeal is to obtain a trial
of the issues raised by the pleadings and motions. .All
of the points hereinafter raised are directed solely to
that end. This brief contends that the trial judge acted
improperly in entering judgment for Plaintiffs Hallstrom at the time of the Pre-Trial, and in denying subsequent motions designed to correct that error. The ple-adings and 1notions presented substantial is.sues of law and
fact which have a direct bearing on the Hallstroms' right
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to recover and upon the amount they are entitled to recover.
We call particular attention of this Court to the
inter-relat~on of the issues presented in Points I and II.
Defendant contends that the transaction entered into
between himself and the Hallstroms was that of a loan
which called for inteTest at a usurious rate. Thus, the
Hallstroms paid $1 ±,371.88 to Buhler and received hack
an assignment of Buhler's equity in the Idaho real estate
contract to the extent of $19,938.86, plus accruing interPst. The payment of that sum was unequivocally guaranteed by Buhler and one other (Funk, R.21) and the
guaranty was secured by a mortgage on Buhler's home.
If Hallstrom insists that the guaranty given by
Buhler is absolute, as the law defines ''absolute guaranty" (see Point II, infra), then he must be taken to admit
that the transachon was in fact a loan. Such a conclusion is inescapable frmn the authorities disclosed in Point
I. They hold that the prime element to he considered
in determining whether this transaction was a sale or a
loan is whether, when Hallstroms advanced the money
to Buhler, they risked anything ·other than the declining
value of their security until such time as they received
the moneys for which they contracted. Clearly if the
guaranty is absolute, all they risked was the decline in
value of the security.
If, on the other hand, Hallstroms insist they
''bought" the contract on the assumpti,on that it was an
.. investment", then it is quite· obvious that the guaranty
is conditional - conditional on Hallstroms suffering a

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6

loss after exhausting their remedies against the Snyders
under the real estate contract. But if it is a conditional
guaranty it is subject to the rules pertaining thereto
as outlined in Point II, infra.
Faced with this dilemma, the plaintiff must necessarily choose one course or the other. In either case, and
whichever course he chooses to pursue he must submit
certain questions of fact and of law to the Trial Court
for determination. Consequently, the Trial Court erred
in entering judgment upon the pleadings and in not framing the questions outlined herein.
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING
TO FRMIE AN ISSUE AS TO· \VHETHER
THE TRANSACTION BET·WEEN THE. PARTIE.S WAS IN F AC'T A LOAN RATHER
THAN A SALE AND AS SUCH, WAS USURIOU1S.
It was contended by the defendant in his Answer
that the transaction between himself and Hallstrom was
a loan rather than a sale (R.ll). The chain of events
began when Buhler needed $15,000.00. Upon a trial of
the issues, he would show that he sought first to borrow
the money, pledging his equity in the Snyder contract
as security. He proceeded by contacting the Contract &
Mortgage Exchange, of Salt Lake City, a business operated by one Roland W. Funk.
Buhler would show that Hallstrom refused to loan
any money to Buhler on the security of the contract.
After negotiation, the parties agreed that Buhler would
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assig-n $19,938.86 of his equity in the contract to Hallsti·oms (R.20). At thP sa.me time Hallstrom insisted upon a guaranty, which toak the fonn of the mortgage
sued upon. (R.5). In addition to the guaranty given by
Buhler, the plaintiff insisted upon a guaranty from Roland W. F1mk (R.21). To protect Funk, Buhler gave
him a note and mortgage on his property in the sum
of $5,000.00 (R.33). In consideration of all of this Hall~trOin gave Buhler $14,371.88.
Presumably, Hallstrom contends that the transaction between the parties is a sale, as distinguished from
a loan. (Actually, Hallstrom simply sought to foreclose
the mortgage without coming to grips with the underlying problems.) But when one makes a sale of property, it is normally assumed that the buyer runs the risks
incident to ownership of the property purchased. It is
true that in form the transaction involved here appears
to be a sale, but the courts have been traditionally reluctant to pennit mere form to prevail over substance.
(See the discussion at 154 ALR 1063.)
In one of the more recent cases discussing the problem, (Britz vs. Kinswater (1960) 87 Ariz. 385, 351 P. 2d
986), the court looked at the transaction from the standpoint of what the buyer-lender was risking and what the
seller-borrower was giving up. One of the criteria used
by the court to detennine that the transaction was a
loan rather than a sale was the fact that the "Seller" was
to receive the contract back when the "Buyer" had received the designated amount assigned from the contract.
This fact, coupled with the fact that the ''Buyer" in that
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case was to receive his money absolutely and in all events,
as here, and that he was not familiar with the property
which he "bought", led the court t.o hold that the transaction was one of loan rather than sale. Other cases supporting this test are Freedman vs. Hendershott (19'55,
Idaho) 290 P. 2d 738; DeWulf vs. Bissell (1957) 83 Ariz.
68, 316 P. 2d 492; and Cowles vs. Zlaket (1959, Calif.)
334 P. 2d 55.
While the record here indicates that the assignment,
by its terms, was absolute, the Pleadings of Plaintiff
(R.1-5), when read together with the terms of the BuhlerSnyder contract (R.24 at 27), indicate that Hallstrom
himself believed he was only entitled to receive a portion of the contract balance and not the whole amount.
Anything over the amount contracted for was to go to
Buhler.
Under the arrangement of the parties, Hallstrom
was to receive $6,568.97 more than he could receive had
he loaned Buhler the money at 10% per annum, the
maximum legal rate of interest. (See Sec. 15-1-2, UCA,
1953; Appendix "A" of this Brief). And Hallstrom was
to receive this sum in a.ny and aU events; if Snyder didn't
pay it, Buhler had to. The legal definition of the word
"loan" states that it involves the delivery of money or
prt>perty by one to another and the money or property
must be returned in any and all events. (See 54 CJS 657)
Even the judgment as rendered awards Hallstrom
$3,123.01 more than he would be entitled to receive had
he loaned the money to Buhler at the maximum rate of
interest (See Appendix "B" of this Brief).
1
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We do not ask this Court at this time to determine
that the transaction was in fact a loan rather than a sale.
What we do ask is that this court reverse the judgment
entered by the trial court and remand the case with
instruct~ons to raise the issues set forth in the ple·adings
as defined in this brief and to try the case on that basis.

POINT' II
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FRAMING
ISS.UES OF LAW AND FACT AS TO
WHETHER HALLSTROMS WER.E ENTITLED TO RE·COVER UNDER THE GUARANTY AND, IF SO, WHkT T'HEIR LOS:S
WAS., AND IN REFUSING TO SE'T ASID·E.
THE JUDGMENT IN ORD·ER TO TRY SUCH
ISSUES.
The instrument sued upon by plaintiff is a mortgage on real property which recites in the body of the
instrument that it is given for the purpose of guaranteeing payment of a contract assigned by the Mortgagors
to the :Mortgagee (R.5). The complaint also recites that
the mortgage was given for the purpose of guaranteeing
the performance of buyers under the contract assigned
plaintiff (R.l). The answer denies the material allegations of the complaint and as a defense sets up that no
notice was given of the breach of the principal contract
and further states that the plaintiffs failed to fix their
loss under the contract against the principal and thus
did not comply with the conditions precedent to the bringing of the action (R.l0-13).
1

The pre-trial order recognizes that the action is one
to enforce a guaranty, but does not require Hallstrom
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to comply with the necessary elements required by law
in such an action before he can recover. It n1entions only
one of the issues raised by Buhler's Answer and Counterclaim. It does not permit Buhler to make any showing
to rebut Hallstroms' contentions (R.18,19). Apparently discussion was had concerning payments and amounts,
but these amounts were never placed in the Order (R.18).
The shortcomings of the Pre-Trial Order were brought
to the .attention of the Court in motions and affidavits
filed by Buhler February 9, 1962. The motions were
denied the day after judgment was entered.
Under the law of guaranty the courts generally divide guaranties into two catagories: one is referred to
as an absolute guaranty and the other as a conditional
guaranty. The absolute guaranty is one by which the
guarantor unconditionally promises payment or performance· on the principal contract on default of the principal
debtor or obligor. A conditional guaranty is one which
is not enforceable immediately upon the default of the
principal debtor ; some contingency other than default
must happen or the guarantee must take some steps to
fix the liability under the guaranty. (Wall vs. Eccles,
(1922) 61 Utah 247, 211 P. 702; 38 CJS 1139, Guarwnty,
Sec 7.)
In effect, it was contended by Buhler's Answer that
the guaranty given by him in this case is .a conditional
guaranty. We presume that Hallstrom would contend that
the guaranty is absolute. Whether it is one or the other
depends on the intention of the parties to be gleand from
the facts surrounding the transaction. (38 CJS 1179,
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Guarooty, Sec. 38). The mortgage as given is quite obviously ambiguous. It guarantees the payments due to
be made by Snyder, but does not specify whether Hallstom is to be protected after pursuing his remedies under the assignment, or before. Since the Hallstroms
first pursued their remedy against the Idaho property,
they construed the guaranty as conditional.

Even if, at first blush, the guaranty involved here
might he thought of as absolute, Hallstrom treated it
as a conditional guaranty because he took over the Idaho property and ultimately resold it (R.38). The rule
in such cases is set forth in 38 OJS 1179, Guaranty, Sec.
38a, as follows :
"Where the parties have given the guaranty
a practical construction, such as by their acts in
carrying· it out, such construction should he given
great, if not controlling, weight in determining
its proper interpretation, except that such con:..
struction cannot be considered where· there is no
ambiguity in the language of the-guaranty."
Since the guaranty was construed by the plaintiff as
conditional he would necessarily have to oomply with
the conditions precedent and fix his loss under the terms
of the guaranty. In the process of doing so, he would
have to show he diligently pursued the collateral security. (38 CJS 1219, Guaranty, Sec. 61)
If the guaranty should be considered absolute, then
Hallstrom really loaned Buhler the money, as discussed
in Point I, supra.
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In any event, whether or not the guaranty is absolute or conditional, the guarantor is entitled to credit
on the debt for any proceeds which the guarantee has
received. See 38 CJS 1245, Guara;n,ty, Sec. 77 a, where it
says:
" ... if the principal obligation is satisfied
in part, the guarantor will be discharged pro
tanto and not entirely, unless a portion of the
debt due is accepted in full settlement."
Again, Hallstron1 sold the property out from under
the defendant Buhler (R ..38). iThe rule quite clearly
says that in terms of guaranty he may thereby waive
his right against the guarantor. See 38 CJS 1296, Guwranty, Sec. 109, where it says in part:
" ... In general a creditor is under a duty to
avoid doing anything which will prejudice the
guarantor's rights and remedies against the principal and with respect to security relied on by
the guarantor for reimbursement."
It is also stated at 38 CJS 1258, Gwaranty, Sec. 87 as follows:
" ... It is a condition precedent to the bringing of suit to enforce a guaranty that the e:xtent
of the liability be determinable."
Thus there are many factors involved in this case
which are yet to be determined and the judgment of the
trial court was premature, to say the least .There are
issues of fact and law which should have been set down
for trial and the judgment should be reversed and set
aside and the ease remanded for trial ·on those issues.
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POINT III
THAT THE FINDINGS OF FAC~r, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECREE DO NOT
·CONFORM TO THE PLEADINGS OR
PROOF, AND .AT· THE VERY LEAST MUST·
BE CORRECTED A·CCORDINGLY.
On January 10, 1962 the lower court directed that
judgment be entered against the defendants "as prayed"
(R. 19'). The complaint recites that the amount owing
on the contract guaranteed was $17,938.86, together with
interest at the rate of 5%. The complaint further recites
that plaintiffs are entitled to attorney's fees and costs.
The prayer of the complaint requests that the court deterrnine the amount due and owing in favor of plaintiffs
including costs and expenses and that the mortgage be
foreclosed and the property s·old as provided by law.
As illustrated in the Statement of Facts, supra, the Findings, Conclusions and Decree ·award Hallstrom recovery
for an additional group of items not mentioned in the
complaint, all of which add up to a sum considerably in
excess of that requested.
Since the law seems to be quite clear that the judgment when entered in any case 1nust conform to the
pleadings and proof in such case (Miller vs. Johnson
(1913) 43 Utah 468, 134 P. 1017; Shurtleff vs. Salt Lake
City (1938) 96 Utah 21, 82 P. 2d 561), at the very least,
this Court should send the matter back to the District
Court for modification of the Findings, Conclusions and
Decree to conform to the allegations of the complaint.
Otherwise the plaintiffs will recover an additional
$2,847.48, plus interest, which they did not contemplate
getting when they brought this action.
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Obviously this case is not the run of the mine foreclosure action. It involves many issues which are complex and which should be properly aired in justice to all
parties.
We respectfully submit that the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Decree should be set aside, and
the case remanded to the ·Trial Court for trial on the
following issues :
1. Was the transaction between the parties a loan

or a

sale~

2. If the transaction was a loan, was the loan usurious~

3. Was the guaranty sued upon absolute or conditional~

4. If conditional, did the Plaintiff fulfill all of the
conditions precedent to bringing suit~
5. If conditional, did the Plaintiff waive his rights
against the Defendant by selling the Idaho property~
6. To what extent is the guarantor liable, if at all,
under his guaranty~
At the very least, the judgment must be corrected
to conform to the pleadings and proof.
Respectfully submitted,
MOYLE & MOYLE
By Hardin A. Whitney, Jr.
Salt Lake City 11, Utah
Attorneys for
Defenda;nts-Appellants
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APPENDIX "A"
Computation Showing Rate of Pay Off and
Additional Sums Hallstrom Contracted
To Receive Over That Allowed If He Had
Loaned Buhler $14,371.88 at 10% Interest Per Annum

Date
Aug. 5,
Dec. 1,
Dec. 1,
Dec. 1,
Dec. 1,
Dec. 1,
Dec. 1,
Dec. 1,

Interest at Amount
Payment 10% Per Credited to Principal
Annum Principal
Balance
(Note 1)
1959 ___________ _
$14,371.88
1959 ____________ $3,204.64 $ 459.10 $2,745.54
11,626.34
1960 ____________ 2,896.94
1,734.31
9,892.03
1,162.63
196L ___________ 2,796.94
8,084.2,9
1,807.74
989.20
1962 ____________ 2,696.94
6,195.78
1,888.51
808.43
1963 ____________ 2,596.94
1,977.36
4,218.42
619.58
1964____________ 2,496.94
2,143.32
42.1.84
2,075.10
1965 ____________ 2,396.94
(39.29)
2,182.61
214.33

On December 1, 1965 Hallstrom would have
received an amount over that which he would
have received on a loan at 10% interest of________$

39.29

He would then be entitled to receive additional
sums as follows :
Dec. 1, 1966 ---------------------------------------------------------- 2,296.94
Dec. 1, 1967------------------------------------------------------------ 2,196.94
Dec. 1, 1968------------------------------------------------------------ 2,035.80
Total Hallstrom entitled to by Contract
over maximum interest --------------------------------$6,568.97
Note 1-Taken from Exhibit "D" to L. M. Buhler's affidavit,
Record, page 32
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APPENDIX "B"
Computation Comparing A ward of Judgment to Hallstrom
By Trial Court With Amount He Would
Receive Had He Loaned Buhler $14,371.88
at 10% Interest Per Annum
Unpaid Mortgage balance (without interest)
determined by Decree --------------------------------------$18,167.31
Amounts Received by Hallstrom to date (R. 21)

3,200.00

Total awarded to or received by Hallstrom ____ $21,367.31
Moneys advanced Buhler by Hallstrom (R. 8) 14,371.88
Recovery by Hallstrom over monies advanced
(excluding interest awarded by judgment) $ 6,995.43
Interest on $14,371.88 at 10% per annum
from Aug. 5, 1959 (date money advanced)
to April 16, 1962 (date of judgment), a
period of 2 years, 8 months, 11 days____________

3,872.42

Excess recovery --------------------------------------------------------$ 3,123.01
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